By: Edward T. F. Wei PhD
It is possible here to acne cream purchase cleocin 150 mg free shipping attribute to skin care korean products purchase cleocin line the impress of the operation of external influence in early life something which one would have liked to skin care 3 months before marriage purchase generic cleocin pills regard as a constitutional peculiarity acne varioliformis order cleocin 150mg otc. On the other hand skin care institute discount cleocin 150 mg otc, a part even of this acquired disposition (if it was really acquired) has to be ascribed to inborn constitution. So we see in practice a continual mingling and blending of what in theory we should try to separate into a pair of opposites namely, inherited and acquired characters. If the analysis had come to an earlier, still more premature end, it might have led to the view that this was a case of late acquired homosexuality, but as it is, a consideration of the material impels us to conclude that it is rather a case of congenital homosexuality which, as usual, became fixed and unmistakably manifest only in the period following puberty. Each of these classifications does justice only to one part of the state of affairs ascertainable by observation, but neglects the other. The Psychogenesis Of A Case Of Homosexuality In A Woman 3859 the literature of homosexuality usually fails to distinguish clearly enough between the questions of the choice of object on the one hand, and of the sexual characteristics and sexual attitude of the subject on the other, as though the answer to the former necessarily involved the answers to the latter. Experience, however, proves the contrary: a man with predominantly male characteristics and also masculine in his erotic life may still be inverted in respect to his object, loving only men instead of women. A man in whose character feminine attributes obviously predominate, who may, indeed, behave in love like a woman, might be expected, from this feminine attitude, to choose a man for his love-object; but he may nevertheless be heterosexual, and show no more inversion in respect to his object than an average normal man. The same is true of women; here also mental sexual character and object-choice do not necessarily coincide. The mystery of homosexuality is therefore by no means so simple as it is commonly depicted in popular expositions ‘a feminine mind, bound therefore to love a man, but unhappily attached to a masculine body; a masculine mind, irresistibly attracted by women, but, alas! It is instead a question of three sets of characteristics, namely Physical sexual characters (physical hermaphroditism) Mental sexual characters (masculine or feminine attitude) Kind of object-choice which, up to a certain point, vary independently of one another, and are met with in different individuals in manifold permutations. Tendentious literature has obscured our view of this interrelationship by putting into the foreground, for practical reasons, the third feature (the kind of object-choice), which is the only one that strikes the layman, and in addition by exaggerating the closeness of the association between this and the first feature. Moreover, it blocks the way to a deeper insight into all that is uniformly designated as homosexuality, by rejecting two fundamental facts which have been revealed by psycho-analytic investigation. The first of these is that homosexual men have experienced a specially strong fixation on their mother; the second, that, in addition to their manifest heterosexuality, a very considerable measure of latent or unconscious homosexuality can be detected in all normal people. If these findings are taken into account, then, clearly, the supposition that nature in a freakish mood created a ‘third sex’ falls to the ground. The Psychogenesis Of A Case Of Homosexuality In A Woman 3860 It is not for psycho-analysis to solve the problem of homosexuality. It must rest content with disclosing the psychical mechanisms that resulted in determining the object-choice, and with tracing back the paths from them to the instinctual dispositions. There its work ends, and it leaves the rest to biological research, which has recently brought to light, through Steinach’sfi experiments, such very important results concerning the influence exerted by the first set of characteristics mentioned above upon the second and third. Psycho- analysis has a common basis with biology, in that it presupposes an original bisexuality in human beings (as in animals). But psycho-analysis cannot elucidate the intrinsic nature of what in conventional or in biological phraseology is termed ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’: it simply takes over the two concepts and makes them the foundation of its work. When we attempt to reduce them further, we find masculinity vanishing into activity and femininity into passivity, and that does not tell us enough. I have already tried to explain how far we may reasonably expect, or how far experience has already proved, that the work of elucidation which is part of the task of analysis furnishes us with the means of effecting a modification of inversion. When one compares the extent to which we can influence it with the remarkable transformations that Steinach has effected in some cases by his operations, it does not make a very imposing impression. But it would be premature, or a harmful exaggeration, if at this stage we were to indulge in hopes of a ‘therapy’ of inversion that could be generally applied. The cases of male homosexuality in which Steinach has been successful fulfilled the condition, which is not always present, of a very patent physical ‘hermaphroditism’. If it were to consist in removing what are probably hermaphroditic ovaries, and in grafting others, which are hoped to be of a single sex, there would be little prospect of its being applied in practice. A woman who has felt herself to be a man, and has loved in masculine fashion, will hardly let herself be forced into playing the part of a woman, when she must pay for this transformation, which is not in every way advantageous, by renouncing all hope of motherhood. Scarcely have we triumphantly repulsed two attacks one of which sought to deny once more what we had brought to light and only offered us in exchange the theme of disavowal, while the other tried to persuade us that we had mistaken the nature of what we had found and might with advantage take something else in its place scarcely, then, do we feel ourselves safe from these enemies, when another peril has arisen. And this time it is something tremendous, something elemental, which threatens not us alone but our enemies, perhaps, still more. It no longer seems possible to keep away from the study of what are known as ‘occult’ phenomena of facts, that is, that profess to speak in favour of the real existence of psychical forces other than the human and animal minds with which we are familiar, or that seem to reveal the possession by those minds of faculties hitherto unrecognized. During this last brief vacation I have three times had occasion to refuse to associate myself with newly founded periodicals concerned with these studies. It is a part expression of the loss of value by which everything has been affected since the world catastrophe of the Great War, a part of the tentative approach to the great revolution towards which we are heading and of whose extent we can form no estimate; but no doubt it is also an attempt at compensation, at making up in another, a supermundane, sphere for the attractions which have been lost by life on this earth. Some, indeed, of the proceedings of the exact sciences themselves may have contributed to this development. The discovery of radium has confused no less than it has advanced the possibilities of explaining the physical world; and the knowledge that has been so very recently acquired of what is called the theory of relativity has had the effect upon many of those who admire without comprehending it of diminishing their belief in the objective trustworthiness of science. You will remember that not long ago Einstein himself took occasion to protest against such misunderstanding. Psycho-Analysis And Telepathy 3864 It does not follow as a matter of course that an intensified interest in occultism must involve a danger to psycho-analysis. They have both experienced the same contemptuous and arrogant treatment by official science. To this day psycho-analysis is regarded as savouring of mysticism, and its unconscious is looked upon as one of the things between heaven and earth which philosophy refuses to dream of. The numerous suggestions made to us by occultists that we should co-operate with them show that they would like to treat us as half belonging to them and that they count on our support against the pressure of exact authority. Nor, on the other hand, has psycho-analysis any interest in going out of its way to defend that authority, for it itself stands in opposition to everything that is conventionally restricted, well-established and generally accepted. Not for the first time would it be offering its help to the obscure but indestructible surmises of the common people against the obscurantism of educated opinion. Alliance and co-operation between analysts and occultists might thus appear both plausible and promising. The immense majority of occultists are not driven by a desire for knowledge or by a sense of shame that science has so long refused to take cognizance of what are indisputable problems or by a desire to conquer this new sphere of phenomena. They are, on the contrary, convinced believers who are looking for confirmation and for something that will justify them in openly confessing their faith. But the faith which they first adopt themselves and then seek to impose on other people is either the old religious faith which has been pushed into the background by science in the course of human development, or another one even closer to the superseded convictions of primitive peoples. Analysts, on the other hand, cannot repudiate their descent from exact science and their community with its representatives. Moved by an extreme distrust of the power of human wishes and of the temptations of the pleasure principle, they are ready, for the sake of attaining some fragment of objective certainty, to sacrifice everything the dazzling brilliance of a flawless theory, the exalted consciousness of having achieved a comprehensive view of the universe, and the mental calm brought about by the possession of extensive grounds for expedient and ethical action. In place of all these, they are content with fragmentary pieces of knowledge and with basic hypotheses lacking preciseness and ever open to revision. Instead of waiting for the moment when they will be able to escape from the constraint of the familiar laws of physics and chemistry, they hope for the emergence of more extensive and deeper-reaching natural laws, to which they are ready to submit. Analysts are at bottom incorrigible mechanists and materialists, even though they seek to avoid robbing the mind and spirit of their still unrecognized characteristics. So, too, they embark on the investigation of occult phenomena only because they expect in that way finally to exclude the wishes of mankind from material reality. Psycho-Analysis And Telepathy 3865 In view of this difference between their mental attitudes co-operation between analysts and occultists offers small prospect of gain. The analyst has his own province of work, which he must not abandon: the unconscious element of mental life. If in the course of his work he were to be on the watch for occult phenomena, he would be in danger of overlooking everything that more nearly concerned him. He would be surrendering the impartiality, the lack of prejudices and prepossessions, which have formed an essential part of his analytic armour and equipment. If occult phenomena force themselves on him in the same way in which others do, he will evade them no more than he evades the others. This would appear to be the only plan of behaviour consistent with the activity of an analyst. By self-discipline the analyst can defend himself against one danger the subjective one of allowing his interest to be drawn away on to occult phenomena. There is little doubt that if attention is directed to occult phenomena the outcome will very soon be that the occurrence of a number of them will be confirmed; and it will probably be a very long time before an acceptable theory covering these new facts can be arrived at. At the very first confirmation the occultists will proclaim the triumph of their views. They will carry over an acceptance of one phenomenon on to all the rest and will extend belief in the phenomena to belief in whatever explanations are easiest and most to their taste. They will be ready to employ the methods of scientific enquiry only as a ladder to raise them over the head of science. There will be no scepticism from the surrounding spectators to make them hesitate, there will be no popular outcry to bring them to a halt. They will be hailed as liberators from the burden of intellectual bondage, they will be joyfully acclaimed by all the credulity lying ready to hand since the infancy of the human race and the childhood of the individual. There may follow a fearful collapse of critical thought, of determinist standards and of mechanistic science. Will it be possible for scientific method, by a ruthless insistence on the magnitude of the forces, the masses and qualities of the material concerned, to prevent this collapsefi It is a vain hope to suppose that analytic work, precisely because it relates to the mysterious unconscious, will be able to escape such a collapse in values as this. If spiritual beings who are the intimate friends of human enquirers can supply ultimate explanations of everything, no interest can be left over for the laborious approaches to unknown mental forces made by analytic research. So, too, the methods of analytic technique will be abandoned if there is a hope of getting into direct touch with the operative spirits by means of occult procedures, just as habits of patient humdrum work are abandoned if there is a hope of growing rich at a single blow by means of a successful speculation. We have heard during the war of people who stood half-way between two hostile nations, belonging to one by birth and to the other by choice and domicile; it was their fate to be treated as enemies first by one side and then, if they were lucky enough to escape, by the other. However, one must put up with one’s fate whatever it may be; and psycho-analysis will somehow or other come to terms with hers. Psycho-Analysis And Telepathy 3866 Let us return to the present situation, to our immediate task. In the course of the last few years I have made a few observations which I shall not hold back at all events from the circle that is closest to me. A dislike of falling in with what is to-day a prevailing current, a dread of distracting interest from psycho- analysis and the total absence of any veil of discretion over what I have to say all these combine as motives for withholding my remarks from a wider public. In the first place it is exempt from the uncertainties and doubts to which most of the observations of the occultists are prone; and in the second place it only develops its convincing force after it has been worked over analytically. It consists, I should mention, of only two cases of a similar character; a third case, of another kind and open to a different assessment, is only added by way of appendix. The first two cases, which I shall now report at length, are concerned with events of the same sort namely, with prophecies made by professional fortune-tellers which did not come true. In spite of this, these prophecies made an extraordinary impression on the people to whom they were announced, so that their relation to the future cannot be their essential point. Anything that may contribute to their explanation, as well as anything that throws doubt on their evidential force, will be extremely welcome to me. He complained of being unable to work, of having forgotten his past life and of having lost all interest. He was a student of philosophy at Munich and was preparing for his final examination. Incidentally, he was a highly educated, rather sly young man, rascally in a childish way, and the son of a financier, who, as emerged later, had successfully remoulded a colossal amount of anal erotism.
The dictionary definition is that a word is “a unit of language” skin care brand owned by procter and gamble purchase cleocin australia, but in fact there are many other language units acne medicine buy cleocin 150 mg visa. Hence the word “cat” has three sounds and one syllable; “houses” has two syllables; “syllable” has three syllables acne inversa cleocin 150 mg on line. This is made up of two units of meaning: the idea of “ghost” skin care equipment cheap cleocin american express, and then the plural ending or inflection (“-s”) acne 30 years old male discount cleocin 150mg on-line, which conveys the idea of number: in this case that there is more than one ghost. Therefore we say that “ghosts” is made up of two morphemes, the “ghost” morpheme and plural morpheme “s”. The same can be said of past tense endings or inflections: “kissed” is also made up of two morphemes, “kiss” plus the “-ed” past tense inflection which signifies that the event happened in the past. Notice that irregular forms that do not obey the general rule of forming plurals by adding an “-s” to the end of a noun, or forming the past tense by adding a “-d” or “-ed” to the end of a verb, also contain at least two morphemes. Hence “house”, “mouse”, and “do” are made up of one morpheme, but “houses”, “mice”, and “does” are made up of two. Young children’s favourite word “antidisestablishmentarianism” is made up of six morphemes. Psychologists believe that we store representations of words in a mental dictionary. It is hypothesized to contain all the information or pointers to all of the information that we know about a word, including its sounds (phonology), meaning (semantics), written appearance (orthography), and the syntactic roles it can adopt. The lexicon must be huge: estimates vary greatly, but a reasonable estimate is that an adult knows about 70,000 words (Nagy & Anderson, 1984; but by “greatly” I mean that the estimates range between 15,000 and 150,000—see Bryson, 1990). Word recognition can be thought of as rather like looking a word up in a dictionary; when we know what the word is, we then have access to all the information about it, such as what it means and how to spell it. So when we see or hear a word, how do we access its representation within the lexiconfi What are the differences between understanding speech and understanding visually presented wordsfi Psycholinguists are particularly interested in the processes of lexical access and how things are represented. Unlike the study of the evolution of the hands and the use of tools, there is no fossil record available. The capacity for language and symbol manipulation must have arisen as the brain increased in size and complexity when Homo sapiens became differentiated from other species between 2 million and 300,000 years ago. There are indications that Broca’s area, a region of the brain associated with language, was present in the brains of early hominids as long as 2 million years ago. The human vocal apparatus has become particularly well adapted for making speech sounds in a way that is not true of animals. Our teeth are upright, our tongues are relatively small and flexible, the larynx (or voicebox) is lower in the throat, and the musculature of our lips is more finely 1. The fundamental structures of the articulatory apparatus appear unchanged over the last 60,000 years. The social set-up of early humans might have played a role in the evolution of language, but many other animals, particularly primates, have complex social organizations, and although primates also have a rich repertoire of alarm calls and gestures, they did not develop language. Some words might have been onomatopoeic—that is, they sound like the things to which they refer. For example, “cuckoo” sounds like the call of the bird, “hiss” sounds like the noise a snake makes, and “ouch” sounds like the exclamation we make when there is a sudden pain. The idea that language evolved from mimicry or imitation has been called the “ding-dong”, “heave-ho”, or “bow-wow” theory. However, such similarities can only be attributed to a very few words, and many words take very different forms in different languages. What gives human lan guage its power is the ability to combine words by use of a grammar, and it is the evolution of this that is the most contentious issue. So murky are the origins of language that it is even an issue whether its grammar arose by Darwinian natural selection. At first sight, some strong arguments have been proposed for why it could not have done so. These include: that there has not been enough time for something so complex to evolve since the evolution of humans diverged from that of other primates; that grammar cannot exist in any intermediate form (we either have a grammar or we don’t); and that, as possessing a complex grammar confers no obvious selective advantage, evolution could not have selected for it. The alternative explanation to evolution by selection is that language arose as a side-effect of the evolution of something else, such as the ability to use more complex manual gestures, or to use tools. One important suggestion is that it arose as a by-product of the increase in overall brain size. Paget (1930) proposed that language evolved in intimate connection with the use of hand gestures, so that vocal gestures developed to expand the available repertoire. On the other hand, Pinker and Bloom (1990) argued that grammar could have arisen by Darwinian natural selection. They argued that there was indeed sufficient time for grammar to evolve, that it evolved to communicate existing cognitive representations, and that the ability to communicate thus conferred a big evolutionary advantage. To give their example, it obviously makes a big difference to your survival if an area has animals that you can eat, or animals that can eat you, and you are able to communicate this distinction to someone else. The arguments that a specific language faculty could have arisen through natural selection and evolution are also covered by Pinker (1994). Elman (1999) argued that language arose from a communication system through many interacting “tweaks and twiddles”. Of course, the relation between evolution and language might have been more complex than this. Deacon (1997) proposed that language and the brain co-evolved in an interactive way. Brain and language evolution converged towards a common solution of cognitive and sensorimotor problems. As the frontal cortex of humans grew larger, symbolic processing became more important, and linguistic skills became necessary to manage symbol processing. This would have lead to the development of speech apparatus to implement these skills, which in turn would demand and enable further symbolic processing abilities. It has also been argued that the emergence of consciousness depended on the evolution of language (Jaynes, 1977). For Jaynes, consciousness in humans was preceded by a “bicameral mind” based in the two hemispheres of the brain, with a mentality based on verbal hallucinations. At this point the hallucinatory “voices in the head”, the gods of myth, were silenced. As can be seen, this is a rather speculative topic; indeed, as Corballis (1992) notes, in 1866 the Linguistic Society of Paris famously banned all debate on the origins of language! Although the way in which language evolved may be unclear, it is clear that language has changed since its first appearance. This relation is apparent in the similarity of many of the words of some languages. More detailed analyses like this have shown that most of the languages of Europe, and parts of west Asia, derive from a common source called protoEuropean. Indo-European has a number of main branches: the Romance (such as French, Italian, and Spanish), the Germanic (such as German, English, and Dutch), and the Indian languages. Finnish and Hungarian are part of the Finno-Ugric family, which is related to Japanese. Clearly Chaucerian and Elizabethan English are substantially different from modern English, and even Victorian speakers would sound decidedly archaic to us today. Whole words drop out of usage (“thee” and “thou”), and we lose the meanings of some words, sometimes over short time spans—I can’t remember the last time I had to give a measurement in rods or chains. We borrow words from other languages (“cafe” from French, “potato” from Haiti, and “shampoo” from India). Words are sometimes even created almost by error: “pea” was back-formed from “pease” as people started to think (incorrectly) that “pease” was plural (Bryson, 1990). Although they have arisen over a relatively short time compared with the evolution of humans, we cannot assume that there are no processing differences between speakers of different languages. Whereas it is likely that the bulk of the mechanisms involved is the same, there might be some differences. Writing is a recent development compared with speech, and while visual word processing might be derived from object recognition, there might also be important differences. As we shall see in Chapter 7, there are important differences in the way that different written languages map written symbols into sounds. Nevertheless, there is an important core of psychological mechanisms that appears to be common to the processing of all languages. The question of what language is used for now is intimately linked with its origin and evolution. It is a reasonable assumption that the factors that prompted its origin in humans are still of fundamental importance. Although this might seem obvious, we can sometimes lose sight of this point, particularly when we consider some of the more complicated experiments described later in this book. Nevertheless, language is a social activity, and as such is a form of joint action (Clark, 1996). We do not speak or write in a vacuum; we speak to communicate, and to ensure that we succeed in communicating we take the point of view of others into account. Although the primary function of language is communication, it might have acquired other functions. In particular, language might have come to play a role in other, originally non-linguistic, cognitive processes. The extreme version of this idea is that the form of our language shapes our perception and cognition, a view known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. We can get a better understanding of the modern methods if we look briefly at the history of the subject. A brief history of psycholinguistics Given the subjective importance of language, it is surprising that the history of psycholinguistics is a relatively recent one. In Germany at the end of the nineteenth century, Meringer and Mayer (1895) analyzed slips of the tongue in a remarkably modern way (see Chapter 12). If we place the infancy of modern psycholinguistics sometime around the American linguist Noam Chomsky’s (1959) review of Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior, its adolescence would correspond to the period in the early and mid-1960s when psycholinguists tried to relate language processing to transformational grammar. Since then psycholinguistics has left its linguistic home and achieved independence, flourishing on all fronts. As its name implies, psycholinguistics has its roots in the two disciplines of psychology and linguistics, and particularly in Chomsky’s approach to linguistics. Linguistics is the study of language itself, the rules that describe it, and our knowledge about the rules of language. For example, we know that the string of words in (1) is acceptable, and we know that (2) is ungrammatical. The primary concerns of early linguistics were rather different from what they are now.
Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3110 What acne blemishes order 150mg cleocin free shipping, however acne moisturizer generic cleocin 150 mg otc, these motives can have been which in so short a space of time could turn the hesitating acne yellow sunglasses buy cheap cleocin 150mg on-line, ambitious man into an unbridled tyrant skin care 40s purchase cheap cleocin online, and his steely-hearted instigator into a sick woman gnawed by remorse acne inversa images discount 150 mg cleocin with visa, it is, in my view, impossible to guess. We must, I think, give up any hope of penetrating the triple layer of obscurity into which the bad preservation of the text, the unknown intention of the dramatist, and the hidden purport of the legend have become condensed. But I should not subscribe to the objection that investigations like these are idle in face of the powerful effect which the tragedy has upon the spectator. The dramatist can indeed, during the representation, overwhelm us by his art and paralyse our powers of reflection; but he cannot prevent us from attempting subsequently, to grasp its effect by studying its psychological mechanism. Nor does the contention that a dramatist is at liberty to shorten at will the natural chronology of the events he brings before us, if by the sacrifice of common probability he can enhance the dramatic effect, seem to me relevant in this instance. For such a sacrifice is justified only when it merely interferes with probability,fi and not when it breaks the causal connection; moreover, the dramatic effect would hardly have suffered if the passage of time had been left indeterminate, instead of being expressly limited to a few days. One is so unwilling to dismiss a problem like that of Macbeth as insoluble that I will venture to bring up a fresh point, which may offer another way out of the difficulty. Ludwig Jekels, in a recent Shakespearean study, thinks he has discovered a particular technique of the poet’s, and this might apply to Macbeth. He believes that Shakespeare often splits a character up into two personages, which, taken separately, are not completely understandable and do not become so until they are brought together once more into a unity. In that case it would of course be pointless to regard her as an independent character and seek to discover the motives for her change, without considering the Macbeth who completes her. I shall not follow this clue any further, but I should, nevertheless, like to point out something which strikingly confirms this view: the germs of fear which break out in Macbeth on the night of the murder do not develop further in him but in her. It is he who stands helpless with bloody hands, lamenting that ‘all great Neptune’s ocean’ will not wash them clean, while she comforts him: ‘A little water clears us of this deed’; but later it is she who washes her hands for a quarter of an hour and cannot get rid of the bloodstains: ‘All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Together they exhaust the possibilities of reaction to the crime, like two disunited parts of a single psychical individuality, and it may be that they are both copied from a single prototype. Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3111 If we have been unable to give any answer to the question why Lady Macbeth should collapse after her success, we may perhaps have a better chance when we turn to the creation of another great dramatist, who loves to pursue problems of psychological responsibility with unrelenting rigour. Rebecca Gamvik, the daughter of a midwife, has been brought up by her adopted father, Dr. West, to be a freethinker and to despise the restrictions which a morality founded on religious belief seeks to impose on the desires of life. After the doctor’s death she finds a position at Rosmersholm, the home for many generations of an ancient family whose members know nothing of laughter and have sacrificed joy to a rigid fulfilment of duty. Its occupants are Johannes Rosmer, a former pastor, and his invalid wife, the childless Beata. Overcome by ‘a wild, uncontrollable passion’ for the love of the high-born Rosmer, Rebecca resolves to remove the wife who stands in her way, and to this end makes use of her ‘fearless, free’ will, which is restrained by no scruples. She contrives that Beata shall read a medical book in which the aim of marriage is represented to by the begetting of offspring, so that the poor woman begins to doubt whether her own marriage is justifiable. Rebecca then hints that Rosmer, whose studies and ideas she shares, is about to abandon the old faith and join the ‘party of enlightenment’; and after she has thus shaken the wife’s confidence in her husband’s moral integrity, gives her finally to understand that she, Rebecca, will soon leave the house in order to conceal the consequences of her illicit intercourse with Rosmer. The poor wife, who has passed for depressed and irresponsible, throws herself from the path beside the mill into the mill-race, possessed by the sense of her own worthlessness and wishing no longer to stand between her beloved husband and his happiness. Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3112 For more than a year Rebecca and Rosmer have been living alone at Rosmersholm in a relationship which he wishes to regard as a purely intellectual and ideal friendship. For an instant she exclaims with joy at his proposal, but immediately afterwards declares that it can never be, and that if he urges her further she will ‘go the way Beata went’. Rosmer cannot understand this rejection; and still less can we, who know more of Rebecca’s actions and designs. How could it come about that the adventuress with the ‘fearless, free will’, who forged her way ruthlessly to her desired goal, should now refuse to pluck the fruit of success when it is offered to herfi She herself gives us the explanation in the fourth Act: ‘This is the terrible part of it: that now, when all life’s happiness is within my grasp my heart is changed and my own past cuts me off from it. Let us listen to her herself, and then consider whether we can believe her entirely. Ibsen has made it clear by small touches of masterly subtlety that Rebecca does not actually tell lies, but is never entirely straightforward. Just as, in spite of all her freedom from prejudices, she has understated her age by a year, so her confession to the two men is incomplete, and as a result of Kroll’s insistence it is supplemented on some important points. Hence it is open to us to suppose that her explanation of her renunciation exposes one motive only to conceal another. Certainly, we have no reason to disbelieve her when she declares that the atmosphere of Rosmersholm and her association with the high-minded Rosmer have ennobled and crippled her. But this is not necessarily all that has happened in her, nor need she have understood all that has happened. Rosmer’s influence may only have been a cloak, which concealed another influence that was operative, and a remarkable indication points in this other direction. Even after her confession, Rosmer, in their last conversation which brings the play to an end, again beseeches her to be his wife. And now she does not answer, as she should, that no forgiveness can rid her of the feeling of guilt she has incurred from her malignant deception of poor Beata; but she charges herself with another reproach which affects us as coming strangely from this freethinking woman, and is far from deserving the importance which Rebecca attaches to it: ‘Dear never speak of this again! Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3114 Rosmer refuses to hear anything about this past. We can guess what it was, though everything that refers to it in the play is, so to speak, subterranean and has to be pieced together from hints. But nevertheless they are hints inserted with such art that it is impossible to misunderstand them. Between Rebecca’s first refusal and her confession something occurs which has a decisive influence on her future destiny. Rector Kroll arrives one day at the house on purpose to humiliate Rebecca by telling her that he knows she is an illegitimate child, the daughter of the very Dr. Hate has sharpened his perceptions, yet he does not suppose that this is any news to her. You know that he won’t leave you a halfpenny as a matter of fact you got only a case of books and yet you stay on; you bear with him; you nurse him to the last. When Kroll began with dark hints at her past, she must have thought he was referring to something else. After she has gathered what he means, she can still retain her composure for a while, for she is able to suppose that her enemy is basing his calculations on her age, which she had given falsely on an earlier visit of his. But Kroll demolishes this objection by saying: ‘Well, so be it, but my calculation may be right, none the less; for Dr. West was her father is the heaviest blow that can befall her, for she was not only his adopted daughter, but had been his mistress. When Kroll began to speak, she thought that he was hinting at these relations, the truth of which she would probably have admitted and justified by her emancipated ideas. But this was far from the Rector’s intention; he knew nothing of the love-affair with Dr. She cannot have had anything else in her mind but this love-affair when she accounted for her final rejection of Rosmer on the ground that she had a past which made her unworthy to be his wife. And probably, if Rosmer had consented to hear of that past, she would have confessed half her secret only and have kept silence on the more serious part of it. But now we understand, of course, that this past must seem to her the more serious obstacle to their union the more serious crime. After she has learnt that she has been the mistress of her own father, she surrenders herself wholly to her now overmastering sense of guilt. She makes the confession to Rosmer and Kroll which stamps her as a murderess; she rejects for ever the happiness to which she has paved the way by crime, and prepares for departure. But the true motive of her sense of guilt, which results in her being wrecked by success, remains a secret. As we have seen, it is something quite other than the atmosphere of Rosmersholm and the refining influence of Rosmer. At this point no one who has followed us will fail to bring forward an objection which may justify some doubts. Rebecca’s first refusal of Rosmer occurs before Kroll’s second visit, and therefore before his exposure of her illegitimate origin and at a time when she as yet knows nothing of her incest if we have rightly understood the dramatist. The sense of guilt which bids her renounce the fruit of her actions is thus effective before she knows anything of her cardinal crime; and if we grant so much, we ought perhaps entirely to set aside her incest as a source of that sense of guilt. Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3116 So far we have treated Rebecca West as if she were a living person and not a creation of Ibsen’s imagination, which is always directed by the most critical intelligence. We may therefore attempt to maintain the same position in dealing with the objection that has been raised. The objection is valid: before the knowledge of her incest, conscience was already in part awakened in Rebecca; and there is nothing to prevent our making the influence which is acknowledged and blamed by Rebecca herself responsible for this change. Rebecca’s behaviour when she hears what Kroll has to tell her, the confession which is her immediate reaction, leave no doubt that then only does the stronger and decisive motive for renunciation begin to take effect. It is in fact a case of multiple motivation, in which a deeper motive comes into view behind the more superficial one. Laws of poetic economy necessitate this way of presenting the situation, for this deeper motive could not be explicitly enunciated. It had to remain concealed, kept from the easy perception of the spectator or the reader; otherwise serious resistances, based on the most distressing emotions, would have arisen, which might have imperilled the effect of the drama. We have, however, a right to demand that the explicit motive shall not be without an internal connection with the concealed one, but shall appear as a mitigation of, and a derivation from, the latter. And if we may rely on the fact that the dramatist’s conscious creative combination arose logically from unconscious premisses, we may now make an attempt to show that he has fulfilled this demand. Rebecca’s feeling of guilt has its source in the reproach of incest, even before Kroll, with analytical perspicacity, has made her conscious of it. If we reconstruct her past, expanding and filling in the author’s hints, we may feel sure that she cannot have been without some inkling of the intimate relation between her mother and Dr. It must have made a great impression on her when she became her mother’s successor with this man. She stood under the domination of the Oedipus complex, even though she did not know that this universal phantasy had in her case become a reality. When she came to Rosmersholm, the inner force of this first experience drove her into bringing about, by vigorous action, the same situation which had been realized in the original instance through no doing of hers into getting rid of the wife and mother, so that she might take her place with the husband and father. She describes with a convincing insistence how, against her will, she was obliged to proceed, step by step, to the removal of Beata. Some Character-Types Met With In Psycho-Analytic Work 3117 ‘You think then that I was cool and calculating and self-possessed all the time! I wanted Beata away, by one means or another; but I never really believed that it would come to pass. As I felt my way forward, at each step I ventured, I seemed to hear something within me cry out: No farther! Everything that happened to her at Rosmersholm, her falling in love with Rosmer and her hostility to his wife, was from the first a consequence of the Oedipus complex an inevitable replica of her relations with her mother and Dr. And so the sense of guilt which first causes her to reject Rosmer’s proposal is at bottom no different from the greater one which drives her to her confession after Kroll has opened her eyes.
From then on they can form hypotheses about what the words mean skin care yang terbaik cleocin 150mg with amex, and develop strategies for using and refining those meanings skin care yoga purchase cleocin 150 mg on-line. The emergence of early words Children’s semantic development is dependent on their conceptual development acne early sign of pregnancy order 150 mg cleocin. There must surely be some innate processes acne 5 pocket jeans order online cleocin, if only to acne zip back jeans cheap cleocin 150 mg without a prescription categorize objects, so the child is born with the ability to form concepts. Quinn and Eimas (1986) suggest that categorization is part of the innate architecture of cognition. The first words emerge out of situations where an exemplar of the category referred to by the word is present in the view of parent and child (see Chapter 3 on the social precursors of language). However, there are well known philosophical objections to a simple “look and name”, or ostensive model of learning the first words (Quine, 1960). Ostensive means pointing—this conveys the idea of acquiring simple words by a parent pointing at a dog and saying “dog”, and the child then simply attaching the name to the object. The problem is simply that the child does not know which attribute of input is being labelled. For all the child knows, it could be that the word “dog” is supposed to pick out just the dog’s feet, or the whole category of animals, or its brown colour, or the barking sound it makes, or its smell, or the way it is moving, and so on. One thing that makes the task slightly easier is that adults stress the most important words, and children selectively attend to the stressed parts of the speech they hear (Gleitman & Wanner, 1982). For example, the word “building” can be used to name many different types of structure. Constraints on learning names for things Perhaps the cognitive system is constrained in its interpretationsfi The developing child makes use of a number of lexical principles to help to establish the meaning of a new word (Golinkoff, Hirsh-Pasek, Bailey, & Wenger, 1992; Golinkoff, Mervis, & Hirsh-Pasek, 1994). The idea of lexical principles as general constraints on how children attach names to objects and their properties is an important one. First, the cognitive system may be constrained so that it tends to treat ostensive definitions as labels for whole objects. This is the whole object assumption (Markman, 1990; Taylor & Gelman, 1988; Waxman & Markow, 1995). Ninio (1980) found that adults talking to children almost wholly use ostensive definition to label whole objects rather than parts or attributes. When adults deviate from this, they try to make it clear— for example, by mentioning the name of the whole object as well. For example, if a child hears the word “cat” in the presence of a cat, they will first assume that the word labels the whole cat (by the whole object assumption) and then that all similar things will also be called “cat” (Markman, 1989). Children prefer to use new words to associate things that are taxonomically related rather than thematically related. Of course, we still have to solve the problem of how children identify how objects are taxonomically related. A third possible constraint is mutual exclusivity assumption, whereby each object can only have one label (Markman & Wachtel, 1988): that is, (unilingual) children do not usually like more than one name for things. For example, they may be biased to assign words to objects for which they do not already have names (the novel name— nameless category or N3C principle; Mervis & Bertrand, 1994). Later on, when children’s vocab ulary is larger and their linguistic abilities more sophisticated, explicit definition becomes possible. Hence superordinate and subordinate terms can be explicitly defined by constructions such as “Tables, chairs, and sofas are all types of furniture”. First, there might be an innate basis to the hypotheses children make (Fodor, 1981). We have evolved such that we are more likely to attach the word “dog” to the object “dog”, rather than to its colour, or some even more abstruse concept such as “the hairy thing I see on Mondays”. It is likely that social factors play an important role in learning the meanings of early words. Joint attention between adult and infant is an important factor in early word learning. Parents usually take care to talk about what their children are interested in at the time. Even at 16 months of age, children are sensitive to what the speaker is attending to and can work out whether novel labels refer to those things (Baldwin, 1991; Woodward & Markman, 1998). Early words may be constrained so that they are only used in particular discourse settings (Levy & Nelson, 1994; Nelson, Hampson, & Shaw, 1993). Recent work has emphasized the role of the social setting in learning new words as a supplement or alternative to innate or lexical constraints. Tomasello (1992b) argued that social and pragmatic factors could have an important influence on language development. The problem of labelling objects would be greatly simplified if the adult and child establish through any available communicative means that the discourse is focusing on a particular dimension of an object. For example, if it has been established that the domain of discourse is “colour”, then the word “pink” will not be used to name a pig, but its colour. Tomasello and Kruger (1992) demonstrated the importance of pragmatic and communicative factors. They showed that young children are surprisingly better at learning new verbs when adults are talking about actions that have yet to happen than when the verbs are used ostensively to refer to actions that are ongoing. This must be because the impending action contains a great deal of pragmatic information that the infant can use, and the infant’s attention can be drawn to this. In summary, the social setting can serve the same role as innate principles in enabling the child to determine the reference without knowing the language. Joint attention with adults, or inter-subjectivity, is an essential component of learning a language. Children appear to vary in the importance they assign to different concepts, and this leads to individual differences and preferences for learning words. The first use of “dog” varies from fourlegged mammal- shaped objects, to all furry objects (including inanimate objects such as coats and hats), to all moving objects (Clark & Clark, 1977). In each case the same basic principle is operating: a child forms a hypothesis about the meaning of a word and tries it out. Brown (1958) was among the earliest to suggest that children start using words at what was later known as the basic level (see Chapter 10). The bulk of early words are basiclevel terms (Hall, 1993; Hall & Waxman, 1993; Richards, 1979; Rosch et al. Superordinate concepts, above the basic level, seem particularly difficult to acquire (Markman, 1989). Taxonomic hierarchies begin to develop only after the constraint biasing children to acquire basic-level terms weakens. Mass nouns (which represent substances or classes of things, such as “water” or “furniture”) in particular seem to aid children in learning hierarchical taxonomies, as they often flag superordinate category names (Markman, 1985, 1989). As such, they are syntactically restricted, which is apparent when we try to substitute one for another. Hence although we can say “this is a table”, it is incorrect to say “this is a furniture”; similarly “this is a ring” but not “this is a jewellery”; and “this is a pound” but not “this is a money”. The properties of objects themselves might constrain the types of label that are considered appropriate for them. Soja, Carey, and Spelke (1991) argued that the sorts of inferences chil dren make vary according to the type of object being labelled. Brown (1958) first proposed that children may use part-of-speech as a cue to meaning. For example, 17-month-olds are capable of attending to the difference between noun phrase syntax as in “This is Sib” and count noun syntax as in “This is a sib”. This is obviously a useful cue for determining whether the word is a proper name or stands for a category of things. The general capacity to use syntax to infer meaning is called syntactic bootstrapping (Gleitman, 1990; Landau & Gleitman, 1985), after the idea of trying to lift yourself up by your bootstraps. Children use the structure of the sentences they hear in combination with what they perceive in the world to interpret the meanings of new words. For example, they use the syntax to help them infer the meanings of new verbs by working out the types of relation that are permissible between the nouns involved (Naigles, 1990). For instance, suppose a child does not understand the verb “bringing” in the sentence “Are you bringing me the dollfi The syntactic structure of the sentence suggests that “bring” is a verb whose meaning involves transfer, thus ruling out possible contending meanings such as “carrying”, “holding”, or “playing”. Even children as young as 2 years old can use information about transitive and intransitive verbs to infer the meanings of verbs (Naigles, 1996). Evaluation of work on how children acquire early names Approaches that make use of constraints on how children relate words to the world have some problems. First, we are still faced with the problem of where these constraints themselves come from. Second, they are biases rather than constraints, as children sometimes go against them (Nelson, 1988, 1990). In particular, very early words (those used before the vocabulary explosion) often violate the constraints (Barrett, 1986). For example, Bloom (1973) noted that a young child used “car” to refer to cars, but only when watched from a certain location. The constraints only appear to come into operation around 18 months, which is difficult to explain if they are indeed innate or a component of the language acquisition device. Nelson (1988, 1990) argued that language development is best seen as a process of social convergence between adult and child, emphasizing communicability. The role of social and pragmatic constraints in early acquisition might have been greatly underestimated. In conclusion, it is likely that a number of factors play a role in how children come to name objects. Errors in the early representation of meaning One useful way of finding out how children acquire meaning is to examine the errors children make. Children’s early meanings overlap with adult meanings in four ways: the early meaning might be exactly the same as the adult meaning; it might overlap but go beyond it; it might be too restricted; or there might be no overlap at all. Words that have no overlap with adult usage get abandoned very quickly: Bloom (1973) observed that in the earliest stages of talking, inappropriate names are sometimes used for objects and actions, but these are soon dropped, because words that have no overlap in meaning with the adult usage are likely to receive no reinforcement in communication. Clark (1973) was one of the first researchers to look at over-extensions (sometimes called over- generalizations) in detail. Over-extensions are when a child uses a word in a broader way than the adult usage. Rescorla (1980) found that one third of the first 75 words were over-extended, including some early high-frequency words. Although shape is particularly important, the examples show that over-extensions are also possible on the basis of the properties of movement, size, texture, and the sound of the objects referred to. Although Nelson (1974) proposed that functional attributes are more important than perceptual ones, Bowerman (1978) and Clark (1973) both found that appearance usually takes precedence over function.
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